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Abstract 
We argue that geographical clustering helps the weakest firms to survive. We model this 
neglected negative externality by adapting the heterogeneous firms model of Melitz (2003) to 
include firms that invest in R&D and firms that do not. Separating the chance of post-entry 
market exit into a system risk that is exogenous to all firms and a firm-specific risk that can be 
reduced by doing R&D, we find that only the most productive firms will invest in R&D. 
Incorporating knowledge spillovers to proxy for geographical proximity, the benefits from 
these R&D investments may spill over to other firms. This occurs either directly by reducing 
the firm-specific risk for non-R&D firm, or indirectly, by making R&D investments cheaper. 
The effects on innovation are different for these two cases: direct spillovers reduce innovation 
while indirect spillovers increase it. However, for both cases it holds that the effect on average 
productivity within the region is clearly negative. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we want to draw attention to an unexpected negative effect of geographical 
clustering on regional output and growth through an inefficient composition of firms in the 
cluster. Firms differ by their intrinsic productivity, leading some firms to be larger and more 
profitable than others in the industry (e.g. Bailey et al., 1992, Jensen et al., 1997). However, 
the benefits of clustering will be relatively larger for firms at the low end of the productivity-
profitability spectrum. This increases the market survival rate of low-productivity firms in 
particular, increasing the share of low-productivity firms in the cluster. The positive 
agglomeration effect of clustering for firms affects the composition of firms in the cluster, 
reducing the overall efficiency of the cluster (and the economy), even if the end result of 
agglomeration is still a net positive.  We make this neglected externality of clustering explicit 
by setting up a model of heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003) where firms may invest in 
R&D to reduce the risk of leaving the market and where agglomeration benefits take the form 
of knowledge spillovers.  
In innovative environments firms need to constantly rethink their strategy and adapt their 
products to changed circumstances in the market. In these environments, firms that have a 
larger existing knowledge base are better able to assess, access and address knowledge that is 
developed externally (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). On the other hand, a larger existing 
knowledge base will also mean that more knowledge spills out of the firm into the rest of the 
cluster (Shaver and Flyer, 2000), undermining the competitive advantage that stems from this 
knowledge base in the first place (Alcácer and Chung (2007) , Pouder and StJohn, 1996). This 
suggests that there are differences between firms within a cluster as far as utilizing knowledge 
goes. In our model, we will look at both effects separately: first we will look at a spillover 
which disproportionately benefits firms who are not innovative, and then we will look at a 
spillover which disproportionately benefits firms who are innovative. In line with the 
(empirical) literature on firm survival we assume that firms make a continuous effort to stay 
in the market (Caves, 1998; Cefis and Marsili, 2005; Pérez et al., 2004).  
To include these insights in a Melitz-type of framework, we split the risk of firm exit into two 
different and independent factors. On the one hand, firms face a systemic risk of market exit 
that is comparable to the fixed and exogenous probability of firm death in Melitz (2003). On 
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the other hand, firms face a firm-specific risk, which they can control by doing R&D. This is 
the effort that is required for a firm to remain a strong player in the market. 3  In the 
terminology of the literature on product innovations our concept of innovation comes closest 
to what is known as ‘incremental product innovation’.4 As an example could serve the Apple 
or Samsung business models, with a new version of the same product coming out each year. 
The benefits of R&D in this respect depend on the firm’s productivity level5. Firms that draw 
a high productivity level have a stronger incentive to stay in the market than firms drawing a 
low productivity level. In our modeling specification this will imply R&D becomes a binary 
choice: firms above an endogenously determined productivity threshold will invest in R&D to 
stay in the market, while firms below the threshold will leave the market after one period.  
One of the alleged advantages of the geographical proximity within clusters is that knowledge 
spillovers may occur. Knowledge spillovers are seen as one of the Marshallian raisons d’être 
of clusters and there is a vast literature that has argued in favor of a positive relation between 
knowledge spillovers and geographical proximity.6,7 In our model we analyze two different 
perspectives on how these knowledge spillovers could occur. The first perspective is that 
knowledge spillovers imply that R&D reduces the firm-specific exit risk of firms that do not 
invest as well. This perspective sees knowledge spillovers as the direct imitation of R&D 
                                                 
3 As such, our approach to R&D is also related to Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) modelling of quality ladders: 
continuous technological progress is required to remain in the market, and those firms that do not climb to the 
next rung will inevitably fall off. 
4 In their critical review of the plethora of definitions regarding product innovation, Garcia & Calantone (2002: 
123) define incremental innovations as “products that provide new features, benefits, or improvements to the 
existing technology in the existing market.” 
5 The argument we develop has its antecedents in Melitz (2003), who provides a formal framework for studying 
the effects of productivity heterogeneity amongst firms in a model of international trade. In his model, more 
productive firms benefit more from trade than less productive firms. Baldwin and Okubo (2006) use a similar 
argument to ours when investigating the effects of regional subsidies on firm location. Our work also formalizes 
the possibility suggested by Swann (2006) that governmental policy encouraging clusters may attract firms from 
the ‘shallow end of the spectrum’ (p. 269). 
6 Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002), for instance, looked at patent citations in relation to geographical proximity 
finding that patents are more likely to build upon previous patents if they were filed near to each other. Other 
contributions showcasing the importance of geographical proximity for knowledge spillovers are Jaffe et al. 
(1993), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Zucker and Darby (1998),  Keller (2002), and Asheim and Gertler 
(2005). Audretsch & Feldman (2004) provide an overview of the literature.  
7 We refrain from explicitly modelling economic clustering and see the existence of knowledge spillovers as a 
proxy for it. This helps us make our main point without entangling ourselves in the analytical complexity of 
Krugman-like models of geographical economics. Though we recognize that the negative effect of cluster 
composition will also have an impact on the incentives for firms to form a cluster, it suffices for our purposes to 
keep clustering exogenous. Our main interest is to unravel a neglected externality due to the heterogeneity of 
firms within clusters and not to analyze the determinants of clustering itself.  
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practices. Such spillovers could for instance occur as a result of R&D labor turnover effects8 
or due to the inspection of patents9.  In line with the literature on absorptive capacity (e.g. 
Findlay, 1978, Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990), we assume that without engaging in R&D 
themselves knowledge spillovers by direct imitation will be imperfect and we use appropriate 
parameterization to account for that. The second perspective on knowledge spillovers we 
analyze is that the benefits of firms investing in R&D reach other firms in the cluster 
indirectly, by making R&D investments cheaper for them (and for investing firms). This 
perspective bears a relation with the idea that knowledge creation entails a positive externality 
as in models of endogenous growth and trade (e.g. Romer 1986, Grossman and Helpman, 
1991). We use a standard parameterization to account for these effects, but also verify 
outcomes in case the spillovers of indirect imitation depend on the number of firms in the 
cluster. As we show, the effect on the extent of innovation in the cluster is different for these 
two different cases. Spillovers by direct imitation reduce innovation, whereas spillovers by 
indirect imitation increase it. In both cases the effect on average productivity within the 
cluster is negative when moving from no spillovers to full spillovers. However, there may be 
an intermediate level of spillovers where average productivity of the cluster is higher than 
without spillovers. Knowledge spillovers help less efficient firms to survive, reducing the 
efficiency of the cluster at large. The knowledge spillovers that come along with geographical 
clustering thus gives rise to a neglected externality. While having positive effects for 
individual firms, the effects on cluster performance are potentially negative. For governmental 
policy this implies that stimulating geographic clusters may have less positive effects than 
previously thought. 
Our focus on how the composition of firms in a cluster may affect cluster productivity is 
different from most of the literature on geographical clustering of industrial activity. Clusters 
have received abundant academic attention, but the focus has been primarily on how clusters 
                                                 
8 Empirical investigations of these include Maliranta, Mohren and Rouvinen (2009), Møen (2005) and Almeida 
and Kogut (1999). 
9 Patent applications must include citations that represent the base of knowledge that the patent was built on. The 
patent examiner determines which patent citations are necessary or pertinent, as they delineate the exact property 
rights related to the patent. Since most citations are not self-citations (they do not refer to patents owned by the 
same company), these represent knowledge spillovers from other firms or institutions. Jaffe, Trajtenberg and 
Fogarty (2000) surveyed patent owners to investigate whether or not patent citations were a valid proxy for 
knowledge spillovers and found that while a significant number of patent citations were not associated with 
knowledge spillovers, patent citations still function as a proxy. 
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affect firm performance. Research on clusters includes general advancements that try to 
establish the broader economic and geographical reasons for clustering (Fujita et al., 1999; 
Brakman et al., 2009), empirical literature to establish these reasons in reality (Baptista and 
Swann, 1998; Bell, 2005; DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999; Molina-Morales and Martinez-Fernandez, 
2003), research that deals with the evolution of clusters over time (e.g. Iammarino & McCann, 
2006; Feldman et al, 2005) and scholarly articles on the ways a cluster affects the operations 
of firms (e.g. Wennberg & Lindqvist, 2010; Molina-Morales and Martínez-Fernández, 2009 ; 
Pouder and St. John, 1996; Boschma, 2005) and how this could differ depending on the 
characteristics of firms (McCann and Folta, 2008, Braunerhjelm and Feldman, 2006). 
Clustering has also received much attention in the policy arena, where it has been deemed a 
desirable trend to foster regional development and economic growth (e.g. European 
Commission, 2003; Sölvell et al., 2003).  
The effect of firm composition on cluster productivity has hardly received attention. One 
exception is Shaver and Flyer (2000), who look at the effect that agglomeration advantages 
have on firm behavior. Their argument is that weaker firms will enter the cluster to benefit 
from it, while stronger firms will stay away to survive on their own.  Our paper also looks at 
the diverging effects clusters have on different types of firms, but we go one step further by 
linking it back to the effect that this has on the cluster as a whole. Policy analysis has to take 
these effects into account, because policies promoting clusters might have a negative effect on 
cluster composition. This negative effect would then counteract the intended effects of the 
policy. Looking at differential effects of clustering on firms would also make it possible to 
reconcile the positive and negative results in.one theoretical framework. By decomposing the 
effects of clustering into positive and negative effects, economic policy can target these 
decomposed effects instead of targeting clusters as a whole, In that sense, we follow the 
recommendations of Nathan and Overman (2013), who argue that “an ‘agglomeration policy’ 
approach (…) seeks to develop interventions that increase the benefits of urban location while 
damping down the disadvantages.” . 
A novelty of our paper regarding the literature of heterogeneous firms is our focus on R&D 
affecting the chance of exit from the market. When addressing R&D investments in a 
heterogeneous firms framework à la Melitz (2003), the focus of the literature has been on 
purposeful investments in productivity enhancement. For instance, in the general equilibrium 
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model of Atkeson & Burstein (2010) heterogeneous intermediate goods producing firms that 
survive an exogenously given probability of market exit invest in R&D to enhance the 
probability of experiencing a positive productivity shock next period. The authors refer to this 
type of R&D expenditure as process innovation. Product innovation is also included in their 
framework, but takes the normal form of firms making a fixed market entry cost before 
finding out their (initial) productivity. Contributions using a similar set-up are Atkeson and 
Burstein (2011), and Burstein and Melitz (2011). Other papers that have incorporated explicit 
decision making of firms regarding their productivity level in a Melitz-type of framework are 
Yeaple (2005) and Bustos (2011). In these papers, each firm can choose to pay an additional 
fixed cost that would lead to a reduction in marginal costs that is equivalent to an increase in 
productivity. Vannoorenberghe (2009) makes the productivity improvement that is reached 
dependent on how much a firm decides to invest. Van Long et al. (2001) discuss process 
innovation in a framework that is related to Atkeson and Burnstein’s (2010) paper. In their 
set-up firms decide on R&D investments prior to knowing their stochastic productivity level. 
Moreover, they use Cournot competition as their modeling framework. 
There are some papers that have looked at the combination of heterogeneous firms and 
clustering. For example, Combes et al. (2012) look at the effects that clustering has on the 
distribution of firm productivities. They argue that there are two effects: a selection effect and 
an agglomeration effect. The selection effect is a left truncation because the environment 
within the cluster is more competitive than the environment outside the cluster, eliminating 
the least productive firms; the agglomeration effect is the general positive effect of clusters, in 
their case higher labor productivity because of more interaction between employees within a 
cluster. This causes a right-shift of the productivity distribution, because all firms gain, plus a 
dilation effect, because the effect of increased productivity is stronger for firms that are 
already more productive. They find empirical evidence for an agglomeration effect, but not a 
selection effect. Our paper analyzes the effects of spillovers in a similar fashion, and we find 
that spillovers of themselves can dilate the distribution of firms on the left-hand side, which 
would cancel out the left truncation of the selection effect. 
This paper also has some implications for the literature on firm survival. There are a number 
of papers which explicitly look at firm performance within clusters. For an overview of the 
effects of clustering on firms, see Rocha (2004). Many papers, like Wennberg and Lindqvist 
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(2010), have found a positive effect of clusters on firm survival. Wennberg and Lindqvist 
even find positive effects of clustering on firm performance. However, they use firm fixed 
effects, which mean that they are effectively ignoring the exact effect that we describe here, 
that firms within clusters tend to be less productive. Our point is that the presence of a cluster 
does not only affect firm performance, but also firm characteristics. Empirical analyses might 
benefit from taking these interdependencies into account.  
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 offers the benchmark model, deriving 
results on aggregate productivity in the absence of clustering. Section 3 applies the model to 
industrial clusters by including knowledge spillovers. Section 4 offers several extensions of 
the model and Section 5 concludes. 
2. The benchmark model 
To investigate the consequences of firm heterogeneity for the aggregate productivity effects 
of clustering we adapt the standard Melitz (2003) model of heterogeneous firms and include 
knowledge spillovers from firm level R&D investments as a proxy of geographical proximity.  
As argued, we see R&D as investments firms make to reduce their firm specific risk of market 
exit. In the original Melitz model, the probability of firm exit is denoted by δ and is 
considered to be fixed and exogenous. This could be seen to reflect the industry-specific risk 
of exit firms face. To set this apart from the risk firms could influence, we assume that the 
chance of firm exit consists of two different and independent components. On the one hand, 
we consider some form of strong systemic risk: that is, the risk that a firm goes out of 
business for reasons it cannot control. We parameterize this systemic risk by ߞ. This type of 
risk is comparable to the exogenous chance of firm exit in the Melitz model. On the other 
hand, we assume a firm-specific risk ߝ, which can be controlled by doing R&D. The firm-
specific risk can be seen as the constant innovation that is required for a firm to remain a 
strong player in the market.  
The entry and exit of firms in industry is essentially the same as in Melitz (2003). Firms are 
uncertain about their inherent productivity and therefore base their entry decision on a 
comparison of the one-time market entry costs and their expected profits of post-entry 
production. Once firms enter, they find out about their actual productivity and decide whether 
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to stay in the market (in case of positive profits) or to exit (in case their productivity level is 
too low to sustain positive profits)10. However, firms also face a risk to exit the market – the 
aforementioned exogenous systemic risk ζ and the endogenous firm-specific risk ε (0 ≤ ζ, ε ≤ 
1). The consolidated chance of survival in the market thus becomes ሺ1 െ ߞሻሺ1 െ ߝሻ, implying 
a chance of post-entry exit δ of: 
 ߜ ≡ ߞ ൅ ߝ െ ߞ ∙ ߝ (1)  
We assume that firms can invest in R&D to lower their firm-specific risk. The decision to 
invest depends on a comparison of the additional profit reached over time and the additional 
investment cost. Suppose that ߝ is a linearly declining function in R&D investments ோ݂஽with 
ߝሺ0ሻ ൌ 1 and ߝ൫݂ோ̅஽൯ ൌ 0: 
  ߝሺ ோ݂஽ሻ ൌ ݂ோ̅஽ െ ோ݂஽݂ோ̅஽   (	0 ൑ ோ݂஽ ൑ ݂ோ̅஽ሻ. 
We assume that the ோ݂஽ chosen has to be incurred each period, reflecting the idea that staying 
in the market requires a continuous R&D effort. In the absence of time discounting, the pre-
entry expected value of a firm is therefore 
߭ሺ߮ሻ ൌ max ൝0,෍ሺ1 െ ߜሻ௧ߨሺ߮ሻ
∞
௧ୀ଴
ൡ ൌ max ቊ0, ߨሺ߮ሻ െ ோ݂஽ߞ ൅ ߝሺ ோ݂஽ሻ െ ߞߝሺ ோ݂஽ሻቋ	 
where ߨሺ߮ሻ is a firm’s profit level, which depends on its (yet unknown) productivity level 
߮ ൐ 0 (see below). A firm’s optimal investment level is determined by taking the derivative 
of ߭ሺ߮ሻ w.r.t. ோ݂஽. Taking into account the specification of ߝሺ ோ݂஽ሻ, this yields: 
                                                 
10 The possibility that firms could invest to enhance their productivity in order to make it profitable to stay in the 
market has been investigated by Vannoorenberghe (2009). As he shows, however, this does not affect the cutoff 
productivity level of profitable entry. The optimal level of investment is strictly increasing in firm size, making 
the optimal investment of the cutoff firm independent of the level of cutoff productivity (propositions 1 and 2). If 
it becomes profitable for less productive firms to invest, it is even more profitable for more productive firms to 
invest.  
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 d߭ሺ߮ሻ
݀ ோ݂஽ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߞሻ൫ߨሺ߮ሻ െ ݂ோ̅஽൯/݂ோ̅஽ െ ߞ
ሾߞ ൅ ߝሺ ோ݂஽ሻ െ ߞߝሺ ோ݂஽ሻሿଶ . 
(2)  
The sign of (2) is independent of ோ݂஽, implying that it is either optimal for a firm to fully 
invest in R&D or not to invest at all. If ሺ1 െ ߞሻ൫ߨሺ߮ሻ െ ݂ோ̅஽൯/݂ோ̅஽ െ ߞ is negative, a firm will 
decide not to invest in R&D and ோ݂஽ ൌ 0. If it is positive or zero (the latter by assumption), a 
firm will decide to invest fully: ோ݂஽ ൌ ݂ோ̅஽.11 However, the decision to invest in R&D clearly 
depends on a firm’s productivity level. Equation (2) is positive if ߨሺ߮ሻ ൒ ݂ோ̅஽/ሺ1 െ ߞሻ , 
implying ߮ோ஽∗ ൌ ݂݅݊൫߮หሺ1 െ ߞሻߨሺ߮ሻ ൐ ݂ோ̅஽൯ as the minimum required productivity level for 
a firm to invest in R&D. Only for the more profitable firms is it worthwhile to invest to stay 
in the market.12 
If firms invest in R&D, they will reduce their firm-specific risk ε to zero, leaving the systemic 
risk ζ as the only exit risk they face.  If a firm chooses not to invest in R&D, the firm-specific 
risk becomes such that it will have to leave the market after one period of (profitable) 
production: ε becomes one. Using a subscript RD to distinguish firms that invest in R&D and 
a subscript H to distinguish firms that do not invest, we get: 
 ߜோ஽ ൌ ߞ and ߜு ൌ 1  (3)  
Henceforth we will refer to firms that invest as innovator firms and to firms that enter the 
market to make a one-time profit as hype-followers.13  
                                                 
11 This binary choice feature of our set-up is a direct consequence of how we specified ߝሺ ோ݂஽ሻ and the fact that 
there is a lower bound of zero to firm specific risk. A binary choice would also follow for the quadratic 
specification ߝሺ ோ݂஽ሻ ൌ 1 െ ሺଵ௕ሻ ோ݂஽
௔/݂ோ̅஽  for all b>0 and a>1. When a<1, however, different outcomes may 
occur. When 0 ൏ ܽ ൏ 1, the specification would yield 0 ൏ ோ݂஽ ൏ ݂ோ̅஽ as optimal outcome  while for ܽ ൏ 0 
ோ݂஽ ൌ 0 results.  
12 This common feature of models with heterogeneous firms and R&D is related to the fact that in heterogeneous 
firms models with monopolistic competition productivity and profitability are positively related.  
13 Our terminology is based on Gollotto and Kim (2003) arguing that there are two types of dotcoms: hype 
followers who spend their money on marketing and do not have long-term viability; and firms who invest a lot in 
R&D and have a long-term vision. Furthermore, our terminology is related to the Hype Cycle concept developed 
by Gartner, Inc. in 1995, see Fenn & Raskino (2008) and Järvenpää & Mäkinen (2008).  It is also related to 
Malerba and Orsenigo (2001 & 2002), who model the history of the pharmaceutical industry. They include two 
types of firms: imitators and innovators. Innovators try to research new drugs, while imitators only imitate the 
drugs already researched by others and do not execute any research themselves.  
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Applying (3) and the firm’s investment decision (2), the value function of the firm can be 
rewritten to 
 ߭ሺ߮ሻ ൌ max ቊ0, ߨሺ߮ሻ, ߨሺ߮ሻ െ ݂ோ̅஽ߞ ቋ 
(4) 
Equation (4) defines two productivity cut-off points for market entry. The first cut-off point is 
the familiar Zero Profit Cut-off point ߮∗ which denotes the minimum productivity level for 
firms to have positive profits: ߮∗ ൌ ݂݅݊ሺ߮|߭ሺ߮ሻ ൐ 0ሻ. This holds for all firms, irrespective of 
their type: since ߞ ൐ 0 and ݂ோ̅஽ ൐ 0, any firm with productivity ߮ ൑ ߮∗ will have negative 
profits when investing.  The second cut-off point is the aforementioned productivity level ߮ோ஽∗  
below which a firm finds it not profitable to invest in R&D. This threshold marks the 
difference between becoming a hype-follower or an innovator firm. As hype-follower a firm 
receives income for one period ߨሺ߮ሻ; as an innovator firm it receives profits until it is forced 
to exit by a systemic shock, yielding a firm value of ሺߨሺ߮ሻ െ ݂ோ̅஽ሻ/ߞ. Consequently, and 
consistent with eq. (2), a firm would only want to become an R&D firm if ߨሺ߮ሻ ൒ ݂ோ̅஽/ሺ1 െ
ߞሻ.	In order for the investment to be profitable, the discounted profit in each period has to 
outweigh the fixed costs associated with staying in the market. Furthermore, as argued, 
߮ோ஽∗ ൐ ߮∗. 
The profits a firm derives from its operations are determined as in the Melitz model and we 
only repeat those equations that are useful for further reference. The demand side of the 
model is governed by a familiar Dixit-Stiglitz type of utility function with a constant elasticity 
of substitution ߪ ൐ 1 . Utility maximization defines demand ݍ  and revenue ݎ  for a firm 
producing variety ߱:  
 ݍሺ߱ሻ ൌ ܳ ቈ݌ሺ߱ሻܲ ቉
ିఙ
 (5)  
 ݎሺ߱ሻ ൌ ܴ ቈ݌ሺ߱ሻܲ ቉
ଵିఙ
 
(6)  
where ݌ denotes price and ܴ ൌ ܲܳ is aggregate expenditure with ܲ denoting the aggregate 
price level 
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 ܲ ൌ ቈන ݌ሺ߱ሻଵିఙ݀߱
ఠ∈ஐ
቉
భ
భష഑
 
(7)  
These equations apply to hype followers and innovator firms alike. Furthermore, all firms 
produce their varieties using labor only, of which the total supply is completely inelastic and 
fixed at L. Production features increasing returns to scale, modeled by a fixed overhead cost 
݂>0, along with a marginal costs that depends on a firms productivity level ߮ ൐ 0: 
 ݈ ൌ ݂ ൅ ݍ ߮⁄  (8)  
Assuming a sufficiently large number of firms in industry, each firm faces a demand curve 
with constant elasticity σ. Profits for an individual variety (omitting indices) can therefore be 
written as: 
 ߨሺ߮ሻ ൌ ݍሺ߮ሻ݌ሺ߮ሻ െ ݓ ൬ݍ߮ ൅ ݂൰ 
(9)  
with ݓ denoting the wage rate, which we normalize to 1. We will refer to this profit level as 
operational profits, as it only takes into account the fixed and variable costs associated with a 
firm’s production activities. For hype followers these operational profits correspond to the 
overall profit level, but innovator firms’ overall profits would also have to include the R&D 
investment costs.   
Standard profit maximization gives a firm’s optimal price and quantity: 
 ݌ሺ߮ሻ ൌ 1ߩ߮ 
(10)  
 ݍሺ߮ሻ ൌ ܴܲఙିଵሾߩ߮ሿఙ (11)  
with 0 ൏ ߩ ≡ ቀఙିଵఙ ቁ ൏ 1 as the familiar mark-up over marginal cost. This implies operational 
profits  of  
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 ߨሺ߮ሻ ൌ ݎሺ߮ሻߪ െ ݂ ൌ
ܴሺܲߩ߮ሻఙିଵ
ߪ െ ݂ 
(12)  
As is well known, these formulas imply that a more productive firm will sell more products, 
charge a lower price and has higher revenues. The equations also allow for writing profits and 
revenue of firms relative to one another: 
 
ݎሺ߮ଵሻ
ݎሺ߮ଶሻ ൌ ൬
߮ଵ
߮ଶ൰
ఙିଵ
 (13)  
 ߨሺ߮ଶሻ ൌ ൬߮ଶ߮ଵ൰
ఙିଵ ݎሺ߮ଵሻ
ߪ െ ݂ 
(14)  
Consequently, we can write the cut-off point for R&D firms ߮ோ஽∗  relative to the cut off point 
for profitable entry ߮∗: 
 ሺ1 െ ߞሻ݂ ቆ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ ൌ ݂ோ̅஽ (15)  
where we applied (14), using that ߨሺ߮∗ሻ ൌ 0 and acknowledging that profitable entry as an 
R&D firm also implies payment of fixed R&D costs. 
In equilibrium, there will be a large number of firms, each producing a distinct product variety. 
We can aggregate the previous results and solve the various variables for the entire economy. 
To do so, we must introduce two other variables: M, which denotes the total mass of 
producers in an economy and hence the number of varieties produced in an economy, and Me, 
the mass of entering firms each period.  
M firms have productivity levels drawn from an ex ante probability density function ݃ሺ߮ሻ and 
associated cumulative distribution function ܩሺ߮ሻ. It follows that the ex ante probability of 
successful entry is ݌௘ ൌ 1 െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ  and that of entering as an innovator ݌௥ௗ ൌ 1 െ
ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ.	Taking into account that the distribution changes due to the exit of firms, the ex post 
probability distributions of productivities become: 
 ߤሺ߮ுሻ ൌ ௚ሺఝሻீ൫ఝೃವ∗ ൯ିீሺఝ∗ሻ       and        ߤሺ߮ோ஽ሻ ൌ
௚ሺఝሻ
ଵିீ൫ఝೃವ∗ ൯
 (16)  
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The average productivity level in the market for each type of firm becomes: 
 ෤߮ுሺ߮∗, ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ ൌ ቆ 1ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻන ߮
ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮
ఝೃವ∗
ఝ∗
ቇ
భ
഑షభ
 
(17)  
 ෤߮ோ஽ሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ ൌ ቆ 11 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻන ߮
ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮
∞
ఝೃವ∗
ቇ
భ
഑షభ
 
(18)  
implying  average overall profits of 
 ߨு ൌ ߨሺ ෤߮ுሻ ൌ ቆ൬ ෤߮ு߮∗൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ݂ (19)  
 ߨோ஽ ൌ ߨሺ ෤߮ோ஽ሻ െ ோ݂஽ ൌ ቆ൬ ෤߮ோ஽߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ݂ െ ݂ோ̅஽ (20)  
where we have applied (12) and ߨሺ߮∗ሻ ൌ 0. Note that the average profit levels refer to the 
overall profit levels of firms as it includes R&D costs.  
Equations (19) and (20) establish an equilibrium relationship between average profits and the 
cut-off productivity level of profitable entry ߮∗. As in the original Melitz model, these are 
downward sloping curves. Furthermore, in equilibrium, the expected value of entering the 
market must be zero: 
߭௘ ൌ ሺ݌௘ െ ݌௥ௗሻ߭ு ൅	݌௥ௗ߭ோ஽
ൌ ൫ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ൯ߨு ൅ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ൯ 1ߞ ߨோ஽ െ ௘݂ ൌ 0 
(21) 
where ௘݂ ൐ 0 denote the fixed entry cost that each firm will have to incur when entering the 
market. We require ݂ோ̅஽ ൏ ௘݂ for otherwise the costs of (renewed) entry would be lower than 
the costs of reducing the firms-specific risk of exit. As in Melitz, we could use this formula to 
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calculate average profit levels and to generate a free entry condition. The average profit 
functions become:14 
ߨு ൌ
௘݂ െ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ൯ ଵ఍ ቆ൬݂ ൬ቀ
ఝ෥ೃವ
ఝ෥ಹ ቁ
ఙିଵ െ 1൰ ቀఝ෥ಹఝ∗ቁ
ఙିଵ൰ െ ഥ݂ܴܦቇ
൫ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ൯ ൅ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ൯ ଵ఍
 
(22)
ߨோ஽ ൌ
௘݂ ൅ ൫ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ൯ ቆ൬݂ ൬ቀఝ෥ೃವఝ෥ಹ ቁ
ఙିଵ െ 1൰ ቀఝ෥ಹఝ∗ቁ
ఙିଵ൰ െ ഥ݂ܴܦቇ
൫ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ൯ ൅ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ൯ ଵ఍
. 
(23)
  
To get the equilibrium values for both cut-off points ߮∗ and ߮ோ஽∗ ,	we set (21) to zero and use 
(19)-(20) to obtain ൫ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ൯ ൬ቀఝ෥ಹఝ∗ቁ
ఙିଵ െ 1൰ ݂ ൅ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ൯ ଵ఍ ൤൬ቀ
ఝ෥ೃವ
ఝ∗ ቁ
ఙିଵ െ
1൰ ݂ െ ݂ோ̅஽൨ ൌ ௘݂ . Applying the expressions for average productivity (17) and (18) this 
reduces to  
ቌቆන ൬ఝఝ∗൰
ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮
ఝೃವ∗
ఝ∗
ቇ െ ൫ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ൯ቍ݂
൅ 1ߞ ቌቆන ൬
ఝ
ఝ∗൰
ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮
∞
ఝೃವ∗
ቇ െ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ൯ቍ݂
ൌ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ൯ 1ߞ ݂ோ̅஽ ൅ ௘݂ 
                                                 
14 These unwieldy functions could be used to prove existence of equilibrium. Their derivation  follow from 
rewriting (19) to ߨோ஽ ൌ ൬ቀఝ෥ೃವఝ෥ಹ ቁ
ఙିଵ ቀఝ෥ಹఝ∗ቁ
ఙିଵ െ 1൰ ݂ െ ݂ோ̅஽ , so that ߨோ஽ ൌ ߨு ൅ ݂ ൬ቀఝ෥ೃವఝ෥ಹ ቁ
ఙିଵ െ 1൰ ቀఝ෥ಹఝ∗ቁ
ఙିଵ െ
݂ோ̅஽. Substituting this in the expression for ߭௘, and rearranging, gives the expression for ߨு in (22). Equation (23) 
is obtained by substituting ߨு  in the expression for ߨோ஽ above. 
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This free-entry condition relates the cut-off points to exogenous variables only. Together with 
equation (14) this could in principle be solved to obtain equilibrium values for the two cut-off 
points in our analysis. 
What is left is to determine the equilibrium mass of entrants into the industry each period, Me. 
Each period, ζ innovators and all hype followers leave the market. To have constant levels of 
all aggregate variables over time (steady-state equilibrium), the mass of exiting firms ߞܯோ஽ ൅
ܯு needs to be equal to the mass of entering firms ܯ௘. Taking into account the probability of 
successful entry, this implies 
 ݌௘ܯ௘ ൌ ߞܯோ஽ ൅ܯு (24)  
Furthermore, the division across types of firms must remain constant in steady state. Because 
the total mass of firms is variable, deriving the mass of innovators does not amount to 
deriving their share. Defining ௥ܲௗ ≡ ௣ೝ೏௣೐  as the probability of becoming an innovator firm after 
successful entry, the number of innovator firms is15  
 ܯோ஽ ൌ ൬ ௥ܲௗ௥ܲௗ ൅ ሺ1 െ ௥ܲௗሻߞ൰ܯ and ܯு ൌ ܯ െܯோ஽ 
(25)  
If this condition is satisfied, the shares of the two types of firms are stable over time. Each 
combination of ௥ܲௗ and ߞ gives rise to a single unique equilibrium ܯோ஽.16 
The main implication of Equation (25) is that it shows that the reduced chance of death for the 
more productive R&D firms begets a selection effect: in the equilibrium distribution of firms, 
the high-productivity R&D firms are better represented compared to a situation where the 
distribution of firms equals the distribution of random entrants. To see this, we remove ε from 
the model, reducing the model to the original Melitz model with no exit divide between 
                                                 
15 Equation (25) has been derived by applying that ܯோ஽ and M remain constant over time. Using that ܯோ஽ ൅ܯு ൌ ܯ, each period ߜோ஽ܯோ஽ ൅ ߜுሺܯ െܯோ஽ሻ firms leave the market, of which a percentage ோܲ஽ re-enter as 
innovative firms. Equating this to the	ߜோ஽ܯோ஽ innovator firms that leave leads to ܯோ஽ ൌ ߜு ோܲ஽/ሺߜு ோܲ஽ ൅ሺ1 െ ோܲ஽ሻߜோ஽ሻ. Implementing (3) gives (25). 
16 Except for the corner case ௥ܲௗ ൌ ߞ ൌ 0. However, with finite innovation costs ௥ܲௗ ് 0 so that we can safely 
ignore this possibility. 
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innovators and hype followers. Then, in each period ߞ  firms, chosen randomly, exit the 
market, and ఍௣೐ firms enter the market to take their place. Because both exit and entry are 
random, the same average distribution persists and there is an equilibrium with ܯோ஽ ൌ ௥ܲௗܯ 
and ܯு ൌ ሺ1 െ ௥ܲௗሻܯ. Now let us suppose that this is also the average distribution in the 
model as we specified it before (ߝோ஽ ൌ 0, ߝு ൌ 1). At the end of the first period, ߞܯோ஽ ൅ܯு 
firms leave the market. The remaining firms then have a different distribution than we had in 
the model with random exiting. Since all hype followers leave the market at the end of each 
period, the remaining firms have a distribution of ܯோ஽. By contrast, new entrants in the next 
period have  the ‘normal’ average distribution ሺ1 െ ௥ܲௗሻܯு ൅ ௥ܲௗܯோ஽ . Hence, the 
distribution changes over time, converging to (25) in equilibrium. The overrepresentation of 
R&D firms in comparison to the fully random exit situation becomes clear when noting that 
௥ܲௗ ൅ ሺ1 െ ௥ܲௗሻߞ ൏ 1 in (25) .  
We are now in the position to calculate average productivity, our main variable of interest in 
this paper. Given the equilibrium distribution of firms, we can calculate average productivity 
as: 
 ෤߮ ൌ ൬1 െ ௥ܲௗ
௥ܲௗ ൅ ሺ1 െ ௥ܲௗሻߞ൰ ෤߮ு ൅
௥ܲௗ
௥ܲௗ ൅ ሺ1 െ ௥ܲௗሻߞ ෤߮ோ஽ 
(26)  
Equation (26) describes ෤߮  for all 1 ൒ ௥ܲௗ ൐ 0 and for all 1 ൒ ߞ ൐ 0.17 If ߞ ൌ 1, we are again 
in a situation where death does not discriminate between the two types of firms and the 
selection effect disappears, implying we have the same results as in the Melitz model. If 
௥ܲௗ ൌ 1, there will never be hype followers and we do not find any different results either. 
However, our parameters always satisfy 1 ൐ ௥ܲௗ ൐ 0 and 1 ൐ ߞ ൐ 0 which means that the 
denominator is always smaller than one and that there is always a selection effect. 
The conclusion of our benchmark model is therefore that, through a selection effect, average 
productivity increases when firms must engage in R&D to remain in the market. In the Melitz 
model only average productivity matters for the value of aggregate variables (Melitz, 2003: 
1700). If such would be the case in our model as well, the selection effect would have a 
                                                 
17If ௥ܲௗ and ߞ  are both zero the starting distribution of firms would remain in place, a possibility we will exclude. 
 17 
similar impact on aggregate variables as a general increase in productivity for all firms. 
However, in our set-up also the distribution of firm productivities affects aggregate variables 
through its impact on the total mass of firms.  
To see this, we consider the expressions for the aggregate variables , which remain the same 
as in Melitz (2003):  
 ܲ ൌ ܯ భభష഑݌ሺ ෤߮ሻ (27)  
 ܳ ൌ ܯଵିఘݍሺ ෤߮ሻ (28)  
 ܴ ൌ ܯݎሺ ෤߮ሻ (29)  
 Π ൌ ܯߨሺ ෤߮ሻ (30)  
Following the same procedure as in Melitz (2003: 1705), we derive 
 ܯ ൌ
ܮ
ߪሺߨሺ ෤߮ሻ ൅ ݂ሻ ൅ ݂ோ̅஽ ௉ೝ೏௉ೝ೏ାሺଵି௉ೝ೏ሻ఍
 (31)  
The denominator of (31) comprises average operational profits, excluding what is paid to 
R&D labor. Payments to R&D labor have been accounted for in the derivation of (31) and 
explain the second term in the denominator.18 It is clear from the formula that an increase in 
the probability of entering as an innovator firm decreases the total mass of firms in the 
industry. Since the introduction of R&D implies an increase in that probability from zero to 
some positive number, the addition of R&D costs begets a lower total mass of firms19. 
                                                 
18 The free entry of firms implies that labor involved with the entry of firms must receive overall profits, which 
in our notation amounts to Π. Production labor (excluding labor involved in R&D) receives ܴ െ ൫Π൅݂ோ̅஽ܯோ஽൯ 
and aggregate payments to R&D labor are ݂ோ̅஽ܯோ஽.	Hence, the total wage bill becomes ܮ ൌ ܴ൅݂ோ̅஽ܯோ஽. Using 
(25) and (29), noting that ݎሺ ෤߮ሻ ൌ ߪሺߨሺ ෤߮ሻ ൅ ݂ሻ, gives (31). 
19 Unlike the total mass of firms, the mass of innovator firms is always increasing in ௥ܲௗ. There is no point at 
which the effect on the total mass of firms starts to outweigh the effect on the probability of becoming an 
innovator. 
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Including firm-specific R&D thus affects aggregate variables through an increase in average 
productivity and through a decline in the mass of firms. We will refer to the former effect as 
the ‘class effect’ and to the latter effect as the ‘mass effect’. 
The mass effect has an adverse effect on aggregate variables: prices increase; quantities, 
revenues and profits decrease when ௥ܲௗ increases. The class effect is less clear, however: 
߲ ෤߮
߲ ௥ܲௗ ൌ ൬
ߞ
ሺ ௥ܲௗ ൅ ሺ1 െ ௥ܲௗሻߞሻଶ൰	ሺ ෤߮ோ஽ െ ෤߮ுሻ ൅	
ܯு
ܯ
߲ ෤߮ு
߲ ௥ܲௗ ൅
ܯோ஽
ܯ 	
߲ ෤߮ோ஽
߲ ௥ܲௗ . 
The first term on the right-hand-side of this equation indicates a composition effect and is 
positive due to ෤߮ோ஽ ൐ ෤߮ு.  The second and third terms on the right-hand-side are both 
negative: when the chance of becoming an innovator firm increases, the most productive 
hype-followers will become innovator firms, lowering the average productivity of both the 
hype-followers as well as the innovator firms. The overall effect on average productivity is 
positive when ௥ܲௗ  is low and small or even negative when ௥ܲௗ  is high. For low ௥ܲௗ  the 
composition effect dominates as its weight approaches 1/ߞ ≫ 1. When ௥ܲௗ is high, by contrast, 
the composition effect’s weight approaches ߞ ≪ 1, implying an overall effect close to zero or 
even negative.20  
Taking the mass effect and class effect together, this implies  that average productivity is 
likely to go up in an economy in which a minority of firms becomes innovator firms. If there 
would be only innovator firms, there would be no class effect but there would be a significant 
negative mass effect due to the R&D spending that all firms are doing. 
The question is then, how does ௥ܲௗ change? ௥ܲௗ is a function of both ߮∗ and ߮ோ஽∗ , ௥ܲௗ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻሻ/ሺ1 െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻሻ. From (15) we know that ߮∗and ߮ோ஽∗  are in a fixed relation. 
Applying ݀߮∗/߮∗ = ݀߮ோ஽∗ /߮ோ஽∗ , we get 
݀ ோܲ஽
ோܲ஽
ൌ െ ቈ ܩ
ᇱሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ
1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ െ
ܩᇱሺ߮∗ሻ
1 െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ቉ ݀߮
∗. 
                                                 
20 The division of firms in hype-followers and innovator firm does not matter as they both pertain to negative 
terms of equal magnitude. 
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Hence, ௗ௉ೃವௗఝ∗ ൏ 0  if ܩᇱሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ ൒ ܩᇱሺ߮∗ሻ . When ܩᇱሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ ൏ ܩᇱሺ߮∗ሻ , the sign is unclear but 
even then is likely that ௗ௉ೃವௗఝ∗ ൏ 0 . For 1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ ൏ 1 െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ  and  
ఝೃವ∗
ఝ∗ ൐ 1 . Hence, a 
reduction in ߮∗ goes in tandem with an increase in ோܲ஽ . This is a logical consequence of 
݀߮∗/߮∗ = ݀߮ோ஽∗ /߮ோ஽∗ . 
The equation implies that the relation between ோܲ஽	and	߮∗ is not independent of the particular 
distribution of productivities. A linear distribution (e.g. a uniform distribution) leads to 
different outcomes than, for instance, a Pareto-distribution. While for a linear distribution we 
derive ܩᇱሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ ൌ ܩᇱሺ߮∗ሻ and hence ௗ௉ೃವௗఝ∗ ൏ 0, a Pareto-distribution featuring   ܩሺ߮ሻ ൌ 1 െ
ቀ௕೘ఝ ቁ
ఈ
 and ܩᇱሺ߮ሻ ൌ ߙ ௕೘ഀఝഀశభሿ  leads to 
ௗ௉ೃವ
ௗఝ∗ ൌ 0 . How the productivities are distributed is 
therefore of crucial importance for understanding the effect of increased innovative activity 
on average productivity. 
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3. Effects of clustering 
The previous section has established the groundwork for an analysis of clustering on average 
productivity. The consequence of clustering is that knowledge spillovers may occur. That is, 
firms not engaging in R&D themselves may nevertheless be able to reduce their chance of 
exit due to spillovers. The importance of geographical proximity for knowledge spillovers has 
been well-established, see Audretsch & Feldman (2004) for an overview. We will consider 
two alternative ways of modeling spillovers. As a first alternative we consider spillovers as 
the ability of non-R&D firms to gain part of the technology researched by R&D firms at no 
cost. This perspective sees knowledge spillovers as the direct imitation of R&D practices. We 
do assume however that these knowledge spillovers by direct imitation are imperfect, for 
instance because non-R&D firms lack the ability to fully absorb the knowledge that is 
inadvertently transmitted. The second alternative of modeling spillovers is that we take 
spillovers to imply that it lowers the costs of doing R&D. This perspective bears a relation 
with the idea that knowledge creation entails a positive externality, making R&D investments 
cheaper for all firms in the cluster.   
As alluded to in the introduction, we keep the geography in our model exogenous and simply 
assume that the model we developed pertains to some geographic cluster of industrial activity. 
The exit and entry of firms could therefore also be seen as firms leaving or entering the 
cluster.21 We will also assume that within the cluster there are no distance decay effects of 
knowledge, so that the gains from R&D accrue to all other firms in the industry.  
Spillovers by direct imitation 
Spillovers imply that the chance of market exit does not only rely on one’s own R&D 
investments, but also on the R&D investments of others. The systemic risk ߞ remains the 
same, but firms are now able to imitate some of the technology researched by others at no cost. 
This reduces the firm-specific risk also for non-investing firms. Using a parameter 0 ൑ ߠ ൏ 1 
to denote the extent of knowledge spillovers, this implies that the modeling of firm-specific 
risks becomes: 
                                                 
21 Demand is geographically concentrated in our set-up, which would be one reason for firms to enter the cluster.  
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  ߝ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ ݂ோ̅஽ െ ோ݂஽݂ோ̅஽   (	0 ൏ ோ݂஽ ൏ ݂ோ̅஽ሻ. 
We restrict ߠ to a value below 1 is required as with perfect spillovers no single firm would 
have an incentive to invest in R&D. For ߠ ൌ 0  we have our benchmark case with no 
spillovers. Our specification implies that only hype-followers will benefit from knowledge 
spillovers. This is a logical consequence of the R&D investment decision: a firm either invests 
fully, reducing the firms-specific market risk to zero, or it does not invest at all, becoming a 
hype-follower. By restricting ߠ to a value smaller than one, we assume that hype-followers 
cannot fully benefit from imitation. This reflects a notion of absorptive capacity - in order to 
benefit from R&D spillovers one should engage in R&D oneself – but also the possibility that 
the technology available does not match the firm’s requirements perfectly.22 We also assume 
that spillovers are independent of the number of R&D firms. Direct imitation implies that a 
hype follower imitates with the specific goal to stay in the market longer, improving its 
product in line with the incremental product innovations of R&D firms. Since all firms 
produce a slightly different product, it thus makes sense to only copy from that firm that is 
closest to what the hype follower produces itself. Furthermore, also for reason of (lack of) 
absorptive capacity hype followers will stand a better chance imitating from an R&D firm that 
produces a variety close to that of the hype follower.23 
Accordingly, with direct imitation the consolidated chances of exit become: 
 ߜு ൌ 1 െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߠ (32)  
 ߜோ஽ ൌ ߞ (33)  
changing the value function into: 
                                                 
22 For R&D firms these issues are irrelevant since also with knowledge spillovers the optimal investment 
decision implies ோ݂஽ ൌ ݂ோ̅஽. The relevant first-order-condition of optimal investment is d߭ሺ߮ሻ ݀ ோ݂஽⁄ ൌ
ൣሺ1 െ ߞሻሺ1 െ ߠሻ൫ߨሺ߮ሻ െ ݂ோ̅஽൯/݂ோ̅஽ െ ߞ൧ ሾߞ ൅ ߝሺ ோ݂஽ሻ െ ߞߝሺ ோ݂஽ሻሿଶ⁄ ൌ 0.   
23 While we acknowledge that a greater number of firms in the cluster could be helpful in this respect – after all a 
more crowded product space would lower average distance between product specifications – it would also make 
it more difficult for a hype follower to pick the right R&D firm to imitate from. 
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 ߭ሺ߮ሻ ൌ max ቊ0, 11 െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߠ ߨሺ߮ሻ,
ߨሺ߮ሻ െ ݂ோ̅஽
ߞ ቋ 
(34)  
Eq. (34) defines a new ߮∗  as well as a new ߮ோ஽∗ . Again it holds that any firm with 
productivity ߮ ൑ ߮∗ will also have negative profits when investing.24 Note that spillovers do 
not affect ߮∗ directly. Ceteris paribus aggregate variables, the profit level of a firm that does 
not invest is not affected by spillovers. This is different for the cutoff point for R&D 
investment, which is now implicit in:  
ߨሺ߮ሻ ൒ ቈ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߠሺ1 െ ߠሻ ቉ ݂ோ̅஽/ሺ1 െ ߞሻ 
The requirement on ߮ is consistent with the FOC on optimal investment.25 Applying (14) and 
using ߨሺ߮∗ሻ ൌ 0, we get 
 ൬ 1 െ ߠ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߠ൰ ሺ1 െ ߞሻ݂ ቆ൬
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ ൌ ݂ோ̅஽ (35)  
For ߠ ൌ 0 (no spillovers), this yields the same ߮ோ஽∗  as in the benchmark model. For ߠ ൌ 1 
(perfect spillovers), no productivity would be high enough to render R&D investment 
profitable. For any value 0 ൏ ߠ ൏ 1, the required ߮ for profitable R&D investment exceeds 
that of the benchmark model: the first term in (35) is smaller than was the case in the 
benchmark configuration, cf. (15). Hence, spillovers by imitation imply that the cutoff point 
for R&D investment, ߮ோ஽∗ , increases, ceteris paribus the aggregate variables. Because of 
knowledge spillovers, there is less incentive to invest compared to the benchmark model. As 
ߠ increases and knowledge spillovers become stronger, this effect on investment becomes 
stronger as well. Because part of the technology is released to all other firms, firms have less 
incentive to do research themselves. 
In this paper we are interested in how spillovers affect the cluster’s average productivity. 
Average cluster productivity can be written as  
                                                 
24 The relevant comparison is ߨሺ߮∗ሻ/ሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߠሻ െ ሺߨሺ߮∗ሻ െ ݂ோ̅஽ሻ/ߞ ൑ 0, which holds true for the  
designated values of ߞ, ߠ and ݂ோ̅஽. 
25 The FOC for optimal investment requires ߨሺ߮ሻ ൒ ሾሺ1 െ ߞሻ ൅ ߞ/ሺ1 െ ߠሻሿ݂ோ̅஽/ሺ1 െ ߞሻ for a firm to invest. 
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෤߮ ൌ ൬1 െܯ௥ௗܯ ൰	 ෤߮ு ൅
ܯ௥ௗ
ܯ 	 ෤߮ோ஽ 
with ෤߮ு and ෤߮ோ஽ as defined in (17) and (18) respectively, and where ܯ௥ௗ  and ܯ are given 
by26  
 ܯோ஽ ൌ ሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߠሻ ௥ܲௗሺ1 െ ௥ܲௗሻߞ ൅ ሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߠሻ ௥ܲௗ ܯ,  
ܯ ൌ ܮߪሺߨሺ ෤߮ሻ ൅ ݂ሻ ൅ ݂ோ̅஽ ሺଵିሺଵି఍ሻఏሻ௉ೝ೏ሺଵି௉ೝ೏ሻ఍ାሺଵିሺଵି఍ሻఏሻ௉ೝ೏
. 
For understanding the impact on average cluster productivity we need to know how the 
average productivity of each of both firm categories changes, which in turn depend on ߮∗ and  
߮ோ஽∗  changes. Since also with spillovers there is a direct and positive relation between ߮∗ and  
߮ோ஽∗  (see further below), ultimately it suffices to determine the impact of spillovers on ߮∗. 
Furthermore, we need insight in how spillovers affect the relative incidence of R&D firms in 
the cluster, ܯ௥ௗ ܯ⁄ . As we will see also here it is important to know the impact on ߮∗. 
We therefore first turn to how the inclusion of θ affects the cut-off point for profitable 
production ߮∗. By (34) we know that there is no direct effect of θ on ߮∗, but clearly there is 
one through the aggregate variables. This is governed by the free-entry condition. Using the 
same procedure as we did for the benchmark model, the free-entry condition with spillovers 
by direct imitation becomes: 
                                                 
26 In deriving ܯ௥ௗ and ܯ we used as before that in equilibrium the mass of entering and exiting firms needs to 
have the same productivity distribution. 
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൬ቀ׬ ቀ കക∗ቁఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮ఝೃವ
∗
ఝ∗ ቁ െ ൫ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ൯൰
ሾ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߠሿ ݂
൅ 1ߞ ቌቆන ൬
ఝ
ఝ∗൰
ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮
∞
ఝೃವ∗
ቇ
െ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ൯ቍ ݂ ൌ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ൯ 1ߞ ݂ோ̅஽ ൅ ௘݂. 
(36)  
For θ ൌ 0 the equation reduces to the free-entry condition of the benchmark model. The 
impact of θ on ߮∗ is effectively determined by total differentiation of (36), recognizing from 
(35) that on ߮∗ and ߮ோ஽∗  stand in a fixed relation:  
 ො߮ோ஽∗ ൌ ො߮∗ ൅ ൬ ߞሺ1 െ ߠሻሾ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߠሿ൰ ൭1 െ ቆ
߮∗
߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఙିଵ
൱݀ߠ (37)  
with a hat “^” denoting a proportional change, for instance ො߮ோ஽∗ ൌ ݀߮ோ஽∗ /߮ோ஽∗ . In the presence 
of spillovers the proportional change of the threshold for profitable entry as an R&D firm 
exceeds that of the threshold for general entry: ො߮ோ஽∗ ൐ ො߮∗. Using this in the total 
differentiation of (36) and applying the Pareto-distribution yields:  
ො߮ ∗ ൌ ܼ݀ߠ 
where Z is shorthand for an expression that is given in the appendix. As we show, Z is 
positive when both of the following two conditions are fulfilled:  
൫1 െ ߞܥሺߠሻ൯ ቆ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ ൐ ݂ோ̅஽ ݂⁄  
and 
ቈቆ ߙߪ െ ߙ െ 1 ൬
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
൅ 1ቇ߮ோ஽∗ ିఈ െ ߪ െ 1ߪ െ ߙ െ 1߮
∗ିఈ቉ ൏ 0. 
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The conditions indicate that higher relative productivity of R&D firms compared to hype 
firms ቀఝೃವ∗ఝ∗ ቁ  due to a ceteris paribus increase in ߮ோ஽∗  will make both conditions more likely to 
be satisfied. This follows from the model because an increase in spillovers implies that firms 
will move from being hype followers to being innovators. The higher the productivity 
difference between the two types of firms, the greater the gain for average productivity when 
the shift occurs. For ߮∗, however, things are not so clear. A decrease in  ߮∗ will make the first 
condition more likely to be satisfied, but the second condition will be less likely to be 
satisfied.. This is likely because of distribution effects: since it is hype followers that shift 
over to being sustainable innovators, lower average productivity for hype followers may 
imply a relatively bigger gain from becoming an innovator, but also that there will be a bigger 
decrease in average productivity of sustainable innovators because of the hype followers’  
switch to innovatorhood. 
In that case, when spillovers by direct imitation are possible (݀ߠ ൐ 0ሻ, the threshold for 
profitable entry in the market increases. Furthermore, ߮ோ஽∗  increases by more, also percentage 
wise. Spillovers imply that fewer hype-followers leave the market each period, implying all 
new entrants should be more productive than before to be able to overcome the more intense 
competition. 
The effects of the changes in ߮∗ and ߮ோ஽∗  on average cluster productivity are not clear though. 
We can write the change in cluster productivity as: 
݀ ෤߮ ൌ ሺ ෤߮ோ஽ െ ෤߮ுሻ݀ሺܯ௥ௗ ܯ⁄ ሻ ൅ ൬1 െܯ௥ௗܯ ൰ 	d ෤߮ு ൅
ܯ௥ௗ
ܯ 	d ෤߮ோ஽. 
The change in ܯ௥ௗ ܯ⁄  is 
݀ ൬ܯோ஽ܯ ൰ ൌ
1
ܯ
߲ ௥ܲௗ
߲ߠ ൜
߲ܯோ஽
߲ ௥ܲௗ െ
ܯோ஽
ܯ
߲ܯ
߲ ௥ܲௗൠ dθ ൏ 0 
for dθ ൐ 0 and when the Pareto-distributio is applied (see appendix). Hence, spillovers imply 
that the relative incidence of R&D firms in the cluster diminishes, exerting a negative impact 
on overall cluster productivity since ෤߮ோ஽ ൐ ෤߮ு. 
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However, spillovers by direct imitation also imply that the average productivity of both 
groups of firms changes. Starting with the effect on average productivity of hype-followers, 
we note that there are two effects that happen to the distribution of productivities of hype 
followers as ߮∗ increases. One is a rightward shift along the Pareto distribution due to the 
proportional changes in ߮∗ and ߮ோ஽∗ . The second is a rightward dilation because ߮ோ஽∗  
increases proportionally more than ߮∗. Both effects become clear when looking at the two 
variables that together determine average productivity, see (17): the volume of productivities 
׬ ఝఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮ఝೃವ∗ఝ∗  and the cumulative density of all firms between ߮∗ and ߮ோ஽∗ , ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ
ܩሺ߮∗ሻ, which is the base over which the volume is spread. For the Pareto distribution, a 
rightward shift of ߮∗ and ߮ோ஽∗  will cause the base to decrease. The Pareto distribution flattens 
out at the right end, which means that a fixed interval of ߮∗ until ߮ோ஽∗  will have a higher 
cumulative density the lower ߮∗ is. Also when ߮∗ and ߮ோ஽∗  experience a fixed proportional 
increase rather than a fixed absolute increase, the negative shift-effect on the base remains. 
However, also the volume will become smaller, so that the rightward shift means a smaller 
volume divided over a smaller base. The same holds true for dilation. Here, ߮ோ஽∗  increases, 
ceteris paribus. This means that the base becomes broader, but there is also some additional 
volume added to the integral, so that the effect on average productivity is again ambiguous. 
The combination of shift and dilation, or the combination of changes in volume and base, in 
the end determine the overall result on average productivity of hype-followers. 
In the appendix we determine these opposing effects mathematically, showing that a sufficient 
condition for ௗఝ෥ಹௗఏ ൐ 0 is that ሾߙሺ1 െ ሺ߮ோ஽∗ /߮∗ሻଵିఙାఈሻ ൏ ሺ1 െ ߪ ൅ ߙሻሺ1 െ ሺ߮ோ஽∗ /߮∗ሻఈሻሿ. 
The balance between dilation and shift effects obscures deriving an unambiguous effect 
however. By contrast, for the average productivity of R&D firms we find an unambiguous 
positive effect of spillovers: ௗఝ෥ೃವௗఏ ൐ 0. In this case, there is neither a dilation nor a shift 
effects, and there is only a left truncation effect due to ݀߮ோ஽∗ ൐ 0. With the firms of lowest 
productivity leaving the distribution of R&D firms, it stands to reason that the average 
productivity of R&D firms increases. 
Knowing the effects on the relative incidence of R&D firms and average productivity if hype-
followers and R&D firms, the effect on overall cluster productivity is ambiguous. With the 
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share of the more productive R&D firms diminishing, spillovers may very well imply that 
average cluster productivity decreases if the productivity difference between hype followers 
and sustainable innovators is not large enough or hype followers are not productive enough to 
begin with.  
 
Spillovers by indirect imitation 
We now assume that spillovers imply that firms are not able to imitate each other’s 
technologies directly, but that they can imitate the research done by others. This implies that 
spillovers reduce the fixed investment costs of R&D and have no consequences for the 
consolidated chance of survival of firms: ߜு  and ߜோ஽  remain as in the benchmark model. 
Hence, using 0 ൏ ߠ ൏ 1  to parameterize the reduction in research costs, a firm’s value 
function becomes: 
 ߭ሺ߮ሻ ൌ max ቊ0, ߨሺ߮ሻ, ߨሺ߮ሻ െ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽ߞ ቋ 
(38)  
where we also retained our assumption that ߝு ൌ 1 and ߝோ஽ ൌ 0. As before, as long as the 
investment costs are non-prohibitive, there will always be at least one firm productive enough 
to invest in R&D. 
The new zero cutoff point for R&D investment becomes: 
 ሺ1 െ ߞሻ݂ ቆ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽ (39)  
Because 0 ൏ ߠ ൏ 1, we know that the right-hand side is smaller than before, implying a lower 
cutoff-point for R&D investment. Therefore, there will be more firms investing in R&D than 
was the case in the benchmark equilibrium. However, average productivity has declined 
compared to the benchmark model. In our benchmark model, R&D investments and the 
uneven chance of survival provide an additional element to the selection process and skew the 
distribution of firm productivities towards the higher echelons. The cheaper R&D becomes, 
the smaller this effect becomes. If R&D investments do not cost anything, the effect 
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completely disappears and our model is reduced to the original Melitz model. Note that the 
formula for the percentage of innovator firms (equation 25) does not change. Instead, the 
change in average productivity arises endogenously through a change in ௥ܲௗ. Despite the fact 
that indirect imitation causes there to be more innovators and fewer hype followers, the 
average productivity within industry declines. 
To formalize these issues we follow the same procedure as before. Average cluster 
productivity can be written as  
෤߮ ൌ ൬1 െܯ௥ௗܯ ൰	 ෤߮ு ൅
ܯ௥ௗ
ܯ 	 ෤߮ோ஽ 
with ෤߮ு and ෤߮ோ஽ as defined in (17) and (18) respectively, and where ܯ௥ௗ  and ܯ are given 
by27  
 ܯோ஽ ൌ ௥ܲௗሺ1 െ ௥ܲௗሻߞ ൅ ௥ܲௗ ܯ,  
ܯ ൌ ܮߪሺߨሺ ෤߮ሻ ൅ ݂ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽ ௉ೝ೏ሺଵି௉ೝ೏ሻ఍ା௉ೝ೏
. 
As before it is useful to first determine how the inclusion of θ affects the cut-off point for 
profitable production ߮∗ . This is governed by the free-entry condition. Using the same 
procedure as we did for the benchmark model, the free-entry condition with spillovers by 
direct imitation becomes: 
                                                 
27 Both expressions are as in the benchmark model, except for the inclusion of 1 െ ߠ in the denominator of ܯ. 
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(40)  
The impact of θ on ߮∗ is effectively determined by total differentiation of (40), reconizing 
from (39) that on ߮∗ and ߮ோ஽∗  stand in the following fixed relation:  
 ො߮ோ஽∗ ൌ ො߮∗ ൅ ቆ ݂ோ̅஽/݂ሺ1 െ ߞሻሺߪ െ 1ሻቇ݀ߠ 
(41)  
Again we see that in the presence of spillovers the proportional change of the threshold for 
profitable entry as an R&D firm exceeds that of the threshold for general entry: ො߮ோ஽∗ ൐ ො߮∗. 
Using this in the total differentiaton of (36) and applying the Pareto-distribution yields:  
ො߮ ∗ ൌ ܼ′݀ߠ 
where Z’ is a shorthand for an expression that is given in the appendix. As we show in the 
appendix, Z’ is negative when both of the following two conditions are fulfilled:  
ሺ1 െ ߞሻ ቆ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ ൐ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ ݂ோ̅஽ ݂⁄  
and 
቎1 െ ߙሺ1 െ ߞሻሺߪ െ 1ሻቌሺ1 െ ߞሻ ቆ൬
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ െ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቍ቏ ൏ 0. 
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The first condition is similar to the one we derived for the direct imitation case. However, its 
implications are different, for together with the second condition it would imply a negative 
relationship between ො߮ ∗ and ߠ. Furthermore, we note that if it holds, Z’<0 follows if and only 
if ఈሺଵି఍ሻሺఙିଵሻ is sufficiently large. This is accomodated by a sufficiently low ߞ and/or ߪ (noting 
that ߙ ൐ ߪ െ 1 by assumption).  
The conditions indicate that changes in average productivity of either group of firms have an 
unambiguous effect: an increase in relative productivity of innovators, effected either through 
an increase in ߮ோ஽∗  or a decrease in ߮∗ will make both conditions more likely to be satisfied. 
As before, this stems from the effects of spillovers. Since spillovers induce firms to become 
hype followers instead of innovators, a higher difference between the two implies that 
spillovers are more likely to have a negative effect on average productivity of the cluster as a 
whole. In that case, when spillovers by direct imitation are possible (݀ߠ ൐ 0ሻ, the threshold 
for profitable entry in the market decreases. Furthermore, ߮ோ஽∗  decreases by more, also 
percentage wise.  
The effects of the changes in ߮∗ and ߮ோ஽∗  on average cluster productivity are not clear though. 
We write the change in cluster productivity as: 
݀ ෤߮ ൌ ሺ ෤߮ோ஽ െ ෤߮ுሻ݀ሺܯ௥ௗ ܯ⁄ ሻ ൅ ൬1 െܯ௥ௗܯ ൰ 	d ෤߮ு ൅
ܯ௥ௗ
ܯ 	d ෤߮ோ஽. 
The change in ܯ௥ௗ ܯ⁄  is 
݀ ൬ܯோ஽ܯ ൰ ൌ
1
ܯ
߲ ௥ܲௗ
߲ߠ ൜
߲ܯோ஽
߲ ௥ܲௗ െ
ܯோ஽
ܯ
߲ܯ
߲ ௥ܲௗൠ dθ ൏ 0 
for dθ ൐ 0 and when the Pareto-distribution is applied (see appendix). Hence, also with 
indirect imitation spillovers imply that the relative incidence of R&D firms in the cluster 
diminishes, exerting a negative impact on overall cluster productivity since ෤߮ோ஽ ൐ ෤߮ு. 
However, as before, spillovers also imply that the average productivity of both groups of 
firms changes. The analysis is qualitatively the same as in the direct imitation case, see the 
appendix. Hence, a sufficient condition for ௗఝ෥ಹௗఏ ൐ 0 is that ሾߙሺ1 െ ሺ߮ோ஽∗ /߮∗ሻଵିఙାఈሻ ൏
 31 
ሺ1 െ ߪ ൅ ߙሻሺ1 െ ሺ߮ோ஽∗ /߮∗ሻఈሻሿ. For the average productivity of R&D firms we find an 
unambiguous positive effect of spillovers: ௗఝ෥ೃವௗఏ ൐ 0.  
Knowing the effects on the relative incidence of R&D firms and average productivity if hype-
followers and R&D firms, the effect on overall cluster productivity is ambiguous. With the 
share of the more productive R&D firms diminishing, spillovers imply that average cluster 
productivity decreases if there is a large difference in average productivity between 
innovators and hype followers.  
Our way of modeling direct and indirect knowledge spillovers could also be linked to the 
theory on absorptive capacity, arguing that the two kinds of imitation are based on two 
different views of absorptive capacity. If we model direct imitation, there is no difference in 
absorptive capacity between firms, as all firms benefit equally from the knowledge spillover. 
If we model indirect imitation, the specific characteristics of a firm become important, as only 
the most productive of the hype followers will be able to assimilate the technology. This is in 
line with the results of Cohen and Levinthal (1989), who argued that firms need to invest in 
R&D to be able to assimilate other technologies. 
 
4. Extensions 
We now drop the assumption that θ is constant. Before, we argued that if one firm discovered 
a particular technology, it would diffuse to all other firms immediately (though imperfectly). 
Now, we argue that the knowledge that other firms can absorb depends on the amount of 
firms which have this knowledge. The more firms know about a specific technology, the 
easier it will be for other firms to imitate it. In mathematical terms, we will assume that the 
extent of spillovers 1 െ ߠ equals ܯோ஽. 
For direct imitation, we must derive a new percentage of sustainable innovators: ܯோ஽ is now 
on both sides of the equation, showing a feedback loop through spillovers: 
 ܯோ஽ ൌ ൬ ௥ܲௗ2 ௥ܲௗ ൅ ߞ െ 2 ௥ܲௗߞ െ ௥ܲௗܯோ஽ ൅ ߞ ௥ܲௗܯோ஽൰ܯ 
(42)  
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Despite the feedback loop, there is still only one equilibrium percentage of sustainable 
innovators for all possible configurations, which is stable 28. The original distribution of firms 
is irrelevant for what the equilibrium looks like in the end and shocks that change the firm 
distribution are quickly repaired. As far as results go, this specification does not lead to great 
differences with the results we found earlier for direct imitation. Each set of ௥ܲௗ and ζ has a 
unique equilibrium, as it did before. The only real difference is that θ has become endogenous. 
But as long as firms take θ as given, nothing really changes.  
For indirect imitation, the formula for the percentage of innovator firms does not change 
compared to our benchmark model, as all changes are again endogenous. However, the 
percentage itself does change. We cannot be exactly sure what happens, but there will be a 
new equilibrium with a higher percentage of sustainable innovators, as before. It becomes 
interesting, at this point, to look at the chance of entering as an innovator, if entry success is 
guaranteed. 
 ௥ܲௗ ൌ 1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽
∗ ሻ
1 െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ  
(43)  
We can already discuss one case here. If this adds up to ௥ܲௗ ൌ ܯோ஽ , the only stable 
equilibrium will be one in which all firms are innovators29. The unstable equilibrium is 
actually impossible to even start with, because of the same argument we used before: as long 
as R&D costs are finite, there will always be at least one firm engaging in it, because there is 
no upper limit on the possible productivity levels firms may have30. We can be sure that 
ܩሺ߮∗ሻ does not change if the percentage of sustainable innovators changes, so we must only 
consider what happens to ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ. What happens to this probability when the mass of firms 
change? 
                                                 
28 As ܯோ஽goes up, the left-hand side always increases while the left-hand side always decreases. This implies 
that there is only one equilibrium. 
29 As long as some firms engage in innovation, ߞܯோ஽sustainable innovators exit each period whereas 
ܯோ஽ሺߞܯோ஽ ൅ 1 െܯோ஽ሻ new sustainable innovators enter the market. Comparing these two gives ߞܯோ஽ ⋚
ܯோ஽ሺߞܯோ஽ ൅ 1 െܯோ஽ሻ, which simplifies toሺߞ െ 1ሻܯோ஽ ⋚ ሺߞ െ 1ሻܯோ஽ଶ. Since ሺߞ െ 1ሻ is negative and 0 ൏
ܯோ஽ ൏ 1, we know that ሺߞ െ 1ሻܯோ஽ ൏ ሺߞ െ 1ሻܯோ஽ଶ and the number of sustainable innovators is always 
increasing as long as there is at least one sustainable innovator to begin with. The only alternative equilibrium is 
ܯோ஽ ൌ 0, but this is an unstable equilibrium because if even one firm starts innovating the economy will move 
away from it. 
30 This is the result for any equation for which ௥ܲௗ ൒ ܯோ஽ for all possible ܯܴܦ. 
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A way of thinking about this is by sorting firms in the economy to productivity. Doing this, 
we can find the first firm which does not engage in R&D investment. To find out if an 
equilibrium is stable, we need only ask what happens if that firm accidentally starts doing 
R&D. If engaging in R&D causes the cutoff point to move by such a length that the firm is 
now below it, the original equilibrium was unstable. If this condition holds for all firms, we 
know that there is only one stable equilibrium, when all firms are innovators. It is impossible 
to state any other condition or law: everything depends on the way in which firm 
productivities are distributed, which is not specified by the Melitz model. If we observe a 
normal distribution with a large number of firms around a specific productivity level, there 
will probably be very many or very few sustainable innovators, as the break-off point will 
likely be in one of the tails of the distribution. 
5. Concluding remarks 
We have added the geographical component to our model by introducing spillovers. We 
operationalized spillovers and showed a number of results when these are included in the 
analysis. We noted that the effect of spillovers on innovation in an economy is strongly reliant 
on the way we choose to model them. If we assume that firms can imitate technology directly 
and thus remove part of the endogenous chance without doing anything, we find that fewer 
firms innovate. If firms can only imitate technology indirectly and the spillovers simply make 
research for other firms cheaper, we find that a selection effect causes more firms innovate 
than in the benchmark equilibrium. However, in both cases, average productivity will decline 
when comparing complete spillovers to none, though there may be some intermediate point 
where spillovers have a positive effect on average productivity. In the final section, we 
allowed the size of the spillover to vary and found that this does not strongly change our 
results. 
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Appendix  
A.1 Derivation of ࣔࡹ ࣔࡼࡾࡰ⁄  and ࣔࡹࡾࡰ ࣔࡼࡾࡰ⁄  
 ߲ܯ ߲ ோܲ஽⁄ ൌ െ ௅௙ೃ̅ವሾ஽௘௡ெሿమ
఍ሺଵିሺଵି఍ሻఏሻ
ሾ஽௘௡ሿమ ൏ 0 and ߲ܯோ஽ ߲ ோܲ஽⁄ ൌ
఍ሺଵିሺଵି఍ሻఏሻ
ሾ஽௘௡ሿమ ܯ ൐ 0  
A.2 Derivation of ࣐ෝ∗ ൌ ࢆࢊࣂ 
Direct imitation 
Rewrite the free-entry (36) to 
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ఝೃವ∗
ఝ∗
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ఝ
ఝ∗൰
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ఝೃವ∗
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ൌ 1ߞ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽
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௘݂
݂  
with ܥሺߠሻ ൌ 1/ሾ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߠሿ	. 
Totally differentiate and rearrange: 
ሺ1 െ ߞሻܥሺߠሻଶ ቈቆන ൬ఝఝ∗൰
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Hence, 
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The expression in the main text is obtained by defining Z = (a-b)/(c-d-e), with: 
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Applying the Pareto-distribution ܩሺ߮ሻ ൌ 1 െ ቀ௕೘ఝ ቁ
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From these expressions we infer that b > (<) 0 if ൫1 െ ߞܥሺߠሻ൯ ൬ቀఝೃವ∗ఝ∗ ቁ
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it follows d+e >0 (<0) if this condition holds.  
 42 
Since c<0, this implies that the denominator of Z has a clear negative sign provided ൫1 െ
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Hence Z = (a-b)/(c-d-e) reduces to Z→ 0. 
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݁ ൌ ߙߞ ቆ
ܾ௠
߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఈ
ቈቆ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ െ ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቉ ≶ 0. 
 
Indirect imitation 
Rewrite the free-entry (40) to 
ቌቆන ൬ఝఝ∗൰
ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮
ఝೃವ∗
ఝ∗
ቇ െ ൫ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻ൯ቍ ൅ 1ߞ ቌቆන ൬
ఝ
ఝ∗൰
ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮
∞
ఝೃವ∗
ቇቍ
ൌ 1ߞ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽
∗ ሻ൯ ቆ1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቇ ൅
௘݂
݂ . 
Totally differentiate and rearrange: 
ሺ1 െ ߪሻ߮∗ଵିఙ ቈቆන ߮ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮
ఝೃವ∗
ఝ∗
ቇ ൅ 1ߞ ቆන ߮
ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮
∞
ఝೃವ∗
ቇ቉ ො߮∗
െ ሾ1 െ ሺ߮ோ஽∗ /߮∗ሻఙିଵሿ݀ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ 1ߞ ൬
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ ൰ ݀ܩሺ߮ோ஽
∗ ሻ
ൌ െ1ߞ ቆ1 ൅
ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽
݂ ቇ݀ܩሺ߮ோ஽
∗ ሻ െ 1ߞ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽
∗ ሻ൯ ݂ோ̅஽݂ ݀ߠ 
Apply ݀ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ ൌ ݃ሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ߮ோ஽∗ ො߮ோ஽∗  and ݀ܩሺ߮∗ሻ ൌ ݃ሺ߮∗ሻ߮∗ ො߮∗, using ො߮ோ஽∗ ൌ ො߮∗ ൅
ቀ ௙ೃ̅ವ/௙ሺଵି఍ሻሺఙିଵሻቁ ݀ߠ we get, 
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ۏ
ێێ
ێێ
ۍ 1ߞ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽
∗ ሻ൯ ݂ோ̅஽݂ െ ߮ோ஽
∗ ݃ሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ ቆ ݂ோ̅஽ ݂
⁄
ሺ1 െ ߞሻሺߪ െ 1ሻቇ ൈ
ቌቆ1 െ ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
ቇ ൅ 1ߞ ൬
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ߞ ቆ1 ൅
ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽
݂ ቇቍے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ې
݀ߠ
൅ ሺ1 െ ߪሻ߮∗ଵିఙ ቈ	ቆන ߮ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ
ఝೃವ∗
ఝ∗
݀߮ቇ ൅ 1ߞ ቆන ߮
ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ
∞
ఝೃವ∗
݀߮ቇ቉ ො߮∗
െ ߮ோ஽∗ ݃ሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻቌ1 െ ቆ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
ቇቍ ො߮∗ 	
െ 1ߞ ቌቆ൬
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ െ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቍ݃ሺ߮ோ஽
∗ ሻ߮ோ஽∗ ො߮∗ ൌ 0 
Hence, 
ሺܽ െ ܾሻ݀ߠ ൅ ሺܿ െ ݀ െ ݁ሻ ො߮∗ ൌ 0 
The expression in the main text is obtained by defining Z’ = (a-b)/(c-d-e), with: 
ܽ ൌ 1ߞ ൫1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽
∗ ሻ൯ ݂ோ̅஽݂ ൐ 0 
ܾ ൌ ߮ோ஽∗ ݃ሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ 1ߞ ቆ
݂ோ̅஽ ݂⁄
ሺ1 െ ߞሻሺߪ െ 1ሻቇቌሺ1 െ ߞሻ ቆ൬
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ െ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቍ 
ܿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߪሻ߮∗ଵିఙ ቈ	ቆන ߮ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ
ఝೃವ∗
ఝ∗
݀߮ቇ ൅ 1ߞ ቆන ߮
ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ
∞
ఝೃವ∗
݀߮ቇ቉ 
݀ ൌ ݃ሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ߮ோ஽∗ ቌ1 െ ቆ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
ቇቍ 
݁ ൌ 1ߞ ቌቆ൬
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ െ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቍ݃ሺ߮ோ஽
∗ ሻ߮ோ஽∗ ො߮∗. 
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Applying the Pareto-distribution ܩሺ߮ሻ ൌ 1 െ ቀ௕೘ఝ ቁ
ఈ
 and ݀ܩሺ߮ሻ ൌ ߙ ௕೘ഀఝഀశభ ݀߮, these 
expressions reduce to: 
ܽ ൌ 1ߞ ቆ
ܾ௠
߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఈ ݂ோ̅஽
݂ ൐ 0 
ܾ ൌ ߙߞ ቆ
ܾ௠
߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఈ
ቆ ݂ோ̅஽ ݂⁄ሺ1 െ ߞሻሺߪ െ 1ሻቇቌሺ1 െ ߞሻ ቆ൬
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ െ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቍ 
ܿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߪሻ߮
∗ଵିఙߙܾ௠ఈ
ߪ െ ߙ െ 1 ൤൬1 െ
1
ߞ൰߮ோ஽
∗ ఙିఈିଵ െ ߮∗ఙିఈିଵ൨ ൏ 0 
݀ ൌ ߙ ቆ ܾ௠߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఈ
ቆ1 െ ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
ቇ ൏ 0 
݁ ൌ ߙߞ ቆ
ܾ௠
߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఈ
ቌቆ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ െ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቍ ≶ 0. 
From these expressions we infer that b > (<) 0 if ሺ1 െ ߞሻ ൬ቀఝೃವ∗ఝ∗ ቁ
ఙିଵ െ 1൰ ൐
ሺ൏ሻሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽ ݂⁄  .  
Furthermore, noting that  
݀ ൅ ݁ ൌ ߙߞ ቆ
ܾ௠
߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఈ
ቈሺ1 െ ߞሻ ቆ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ െ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቉, 
it follows d+e >0 (<0) if this condition holds.  
Since c<0, this implies that the denominator of Z’ has a clear negative sign provided ሺ1 െ
ߞሻ ൬ቀఝೃವ∗ఝ∗ ቁ
ఙିଵ െ 1൰ ൐ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ ݂ோ̅஽ ݂⁄ . This implies that if this latter condition holds, to get a 
definite sign for Z requires a-b<0. In that case Z > 0.  
. 
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ܽ െ ܾ ൌ 1ߞ ቆ
ܾ௠
߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఈ ݂ோ̅஽
݂ ቎1 െ
ߙ
ሺ1 െ ߞሻሺߪ െ 1ሻቌሺ1 െ ߞሻ ቆ൬
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ െ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቍ቏. 
We note that if ቆሺ1 െ ߞሻ ൬ቀఝೃವ∗ఝ∗ ቁ
ఙିଵ െ 1൰ െ ሺଵିఏሻ௙ೃ̅ವ௙ ቇ ൐ 0,	it follows that ሺܽ െ ܾሻ ൏ 0 if and 
only if ఈሺଵି఍ሻሺఙିଵሻ is sufficiently large. This is accomodated by a sufficiently low ߞ and/or ߪ 
(noting that ߙ ൐ ߪ െ 1 by assumption).  
For θ=1 we get (ఝೃವ∗ఝ∗ → 1ሻ: ܽ ൌ
ଵ
఍ ቀ
௕೘
ఝೃವ∗
ቁఈ ௙ೃ̅ವ௙ ൐ 0, ܾ ൌ 0, ܿ ൌ
െ ଵ఍
ሺଵିఙሻఝ∗భష഑ఈ௕೘ഀ
ఙିఈିଵ ߮ோ஽∗ ఙିఈିଵ ൏ 0, ݀ ൌ 0, and ݁ ൌ 0. Hence Z = (a-b)/(c-d-e) reduces to a/c, 
which equals: 
െ ሺߪ െ ߙ െ 1ሻ ݂ோ̅஽ ݂⁄ߙሺ1 െ ߪሻ߮∗ଵିఙ߮ோ஽∗ ఙିଵ
൏ 0. 
For θ=0 we get: 
ܽ ൌ 1ߞ ቆ
ܾ௠
߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఈ ݂ோ̅஽
݂ ൐ 0 
ܾ ൌ ߙ ቆ ܾ௠߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఈ
ቆ ݂ோ̅஽ ݂⁄ሺ1 െ ߞሻሺߪ െ 1ሻቇቌሺ1 െ ߞሻ ቆ൬
߮ோ஽∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ 1ቇ െ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቍ 
ܿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߪሻ߮
∗ଵିఙߙܾ௠ఈ
ߪ െ ߙ െ 1 ൤൬1 െ
1
ߞ൰߮ோ஽
∗ ఙିఈିଵ െ ߮∗ఙିఈିଵ൨ ൏ 0 
݀ ൌ ߙ ቆ ܾ௠߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఈ
ቆ1 െ ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
ቇ ൏ 0 
݁ ൌ ߙߞ ቆ
ܾ௠
߮ோ஽∗ ቇ
ఈ
ቌ൬߮ோ஽
∗
߮∗ ൰
ఙିଵ
െ ቆ1 ൅ ݂ோ̅஽݂ ቇቍ ≶ 0. 
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A.3 Derivation ࢊቀࡹࡾࡰࡹ ቁ ൌ
૚
ࡹ
ࣔࡼ࢘ࢊ
ࣔࣂ ቄ
ࣔࡹࡾࡰ
ࣔࡼ࢘ࢊ െ
ࡹࡾࡰ
ࡹ
ࣔࡹ
ࣔࡼ࢘ࢊቅ ܌ી ൏ 0 for ܌ી ൐ 0 
Direct imitation: ݀ ቀெೃವெ ቁ ൌ
ଵ
ெ
డ௉ೝ೏
డఏ ቄ
డெೃವ
డ௉ೝ೏ െ
ெೃವ
ெ
డெ
డ௉ೝ೏ቅ dθ ൏ 0 for dθ ൐ 0 
o ߲ܯ ߲ ோܲ஽⁄ ൌ െ ఍ሺଵିሺଵି఍ሻఏሻ௙ೃ̅ವ௅ሾሺଵିሺଵି఍ሻఏሻ௉ೝ೏/ெோ஽ሿమ ൏ 0 
o ߲ܯோ஽ ߲ ோܲ஽⁄ ൌ ఍ሺଵିሺଵି఍ሻఏሻெሾሺଵିሺଵି఍ሻఏሻ௉ೝ೏/ெ௥ௗሿమ ൐ 0 
o డ௉ೝ೏డఏ ൏ 0 through its dependence with ො߮ ∗. 
 ௗ௉ೃವ௉ೃವ ൌ െ ൤
ீᇲሺఝೃವ∗ ሻ
ଵିீሺఝೃವ∗ ሻ
݀߮ோ஽∗ െ ீ
ᇲሺఝ∗ሻ
ଵିீሺఝ∗ሻ ݀߮∗൨  
 ௗ௉ೃವ௉ೃವ ൌ െ ൤
ீᇲሺఝೃವ∗ ሻ
ଵିீሺఝೃವ∗ ሻ
ఝೃವ∗
ఝ∗ െ
ீᇲሺఝ∗ሻ
ଵିீሺఝ∗ሻ൨ ݀߮∗ െ ߮ோ஽∗
ீᇲሺఝ∗ሻ
ଵିீሺఝ∗ሻ ܺ݀θ  
with ܺ ≡ ቀ ఍ሺଵିఏሻሾଵିሺଵି఍ሻఏሿቁ ൬1 െ ቀ
ఝ∗
ఝೃವ∗
ቁఙିଵ൰ ൐ 0 . For the Pareto-distribution 
the term in brackets becomes zeroሺG’/ሺ1 െ Gሻ 	ൌ α/φ	, implying that ௗ௉ೃವ௉ೃವ ൌ
െߙܺ݀ߠ ൏ 0. 
 
Indirect imitation: ݀ ቀெೃವெ ቁ ൌ
ଵ
ெ
డ௉ೝ೏
డఏ ቄ
డெೃವ
డ௉ೝ೏ െ
ெೃವ
ெ
డெ
డ௉ೝ೏ቅ dθ ൏ 0 for dθ ൐ 0 
o ߲ܯ ߲ ோܲ஽⁄ ൌ െ ఍௙ೃ̅ವ௅ሾ௉ೝ೏/ெೃವሿమ ൏ 0 
o ߲ܯோ஽ ߲ ோܲ஽⁄ ൌ ఍ெሾ௉ೝ೏/ெ௥ௗሿమ ൐ 0 
o డ௉ೝ೏డఏ ൏ 0 through its dependence with ො߮ ∗. 
 ௗ௉ೃವ௉ೃವ ൌ െ ൤
ீᇲሺఝೃವ∗ ሻ
ଵିீሺఝೃವ∗ ሻ
݀߮ோ஽∗ െ ீ
ᇲሺఝ∗ሻ
ଵିீሺఝ∗ሻ ݀߮∗൨  
 ௗ௉ೃವ௉ೃವ ൌ െ ൤
ீᇲሺఝೃವ∗ ሻ
ଵିீሺఝೃವ∗ ሻ
ఝೃವ∗
ఝ∗ െ
ீᇲሺఝ∗ሻ
ଵିீሺఝ∗ሻ൨ ݀߮∗ െ ߮ோ஽∗
ீᇲሺఝ∗ሻ
ଵିீሺఝ∗ሻ ܺ݀θ  
with ܺ ≡ ቀ ௙ೃ̅ವ/௙ሺଵି఍ሻሺఙିଵሻቁ ൐ 0 . For the Pareto-distribution the term in brackets 
becomes zero; ሺG’/ሺ1 െ Gሻ 	ൌ α/φ	, implying that ௗ௉ೃವ௉ೃವ ൌ െߙܺ݀ߠ ൏ 0. 
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A.4 Effect on ࡹ࢘ࢊ and ࡹ, keeping ࣐෥  constant (direct imitation case): 
o ௗெೃವௗఏ ൌ
ሺଵି఍ሻ௉ೝ೏ሺଵି௉ೝ೏ሻ఍
ሾ஽ೃವሿమ ܯ ቄ
ெೃವ௙ೃ̅ವ
௅ െ 1ቅ ൅
఍ሺଵିሺଵି఍ሻఏሻ
ሾ஽ೃವሿమ ܯ
డ௉ೃವ
డఏ  
o ௗௌఏ ൌ െ
௅௙ೃ̅ವ
ሾ஽ಾሿమሾ஽ೃವሿమ ቄߞሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻߠሻ
డ௉ೃವ
డఏ െ ሺ1 െ ߞሻ ௥ܲௗሺ1 െ ௥ܲௗሻߞቅ 
where ܦோ஽ andܦெ are short-hand notations for, respectively, the denominators of 
the expressions for MRD and M. 
As long as డ௉ೃವడఏ ൑ 0, it follows that the number of R&D firms in the cluster falls 
(dMRD/dθ < 0)31, whereas the total number of firms M goes up (dM/dθ > 0). 
Ceteris paribus ෤߮ , the possibility of spillovers by direct imitation then lowers the 
number of R&D firms in the cluster. 
 
 
A.5 Derivation of ࢊ࣐෥ࡴࢊࣂ  and 
ࢊ࣐෥ࡾࡰ
ࢊࣂ . 
Recall from (16) that ෤߮ுሺ߮∗, ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ ൌ ൭
׬ ఝ഑షభ௚ሺఝሻௗఝകೃವ
∗
ക∗
ீ൫ఝೃವ∗ ൯ିீሺఝ∗ሻ
൱
భ
഑షభ
 . Hence, we can write 
ܺு ෤߮෠ு ൌ ൭߮ோ஽∗ ఙିଵ െ
׬ ఝ഑షభ௚ሺఝሻௗఝകೃವ
∗
ക∗
ீ൫ఝೃವ∗ ൯ିீሺఝ∗ሻ
൱ ݀ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ൭߮∗ఙିଵ െ
׬ ఝ഑షభ௚ሺఝሻௗఝകೃವ
∗
ക∗
ீ൫ఝೃವ∗ ൯ିீሺఝ∗ሻ
൱ ݀ܩሺ߮∗ሻ  
with ܺு ≡ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ ෤߮ுఙିଵ	ሾܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ܩሺ߮∗ሻሿ ൐ 0.  
Applying the Pareto-distribution ܩሺ߮ሻ ൌ 1 െ ቀ௕೘ఝ ቁ
ఈ
 and ݀ܩሺ߮ሻ ൌ ߙ ௕೘ഀఝഀశభ ݀߮ we get, after 
rearranging, 
ܺு
ߙ ෤߮෠ு ൌ
ߙܾ௠ఈ
ߪ െ ߙ െ 1ቆ
߮ோ஽∗ ିఈ ො߮ோ஽∗ െ ߮∗ିఈ ො߮∗
߮ோ஽∗ ିఈ െ ߮∗ିఈ ቇ ൫߮ோ஽
∗ ఙିఈିଵ െ ߮∗ఙିఈିଵ൯ 
                                                 
31In the expression for dMRD/dθ the term ܯோ஽݂ோ̅஽/ܮ െ 1 < 0 since L=R+ܯோ஽݂ோ̅஽. 
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൅൫߮ோ஽∗ ఙିఈିଵ ො߮ோ஽∗ െ ߮∗ఙିఈିଵ ො߮∗൯ܾ௠ఈ . 
Direct imitation case: 
From (37) we know that 	
ො߮ோ஽∗ ൌ ො߮∗ ൅ ܺ݀ߠ 
with ܺ ≡ ቀ ఍ሺଵିఏሻሾଵିሺଵି఍ሻఏሿቁ ൬1 െ ቀ
ఝ∗
ఝೃವ∗
ቁఙିଵ൰ ൐ 0 as before. Hence, 	
ܺு
ߙ ෤߮෠ு ൌ
ߙܾ௠ఈ
ߪ െ ߙ െ 1ቆ ො߮
∗ ൅ ߮ோ஽
∗ ିఈܺ݀ߠ
߮ோ஽∗ ିఈ െ ߮∗ିఈቇ ൫߮ோ஽
∗ ఙିఈିଵ െ ߮∗ఙିఈିଵ൯ 
൅൫߮ோ஽∗ ఙିఈିଵ െ ߮∗ఙିఈିଵ൯ܾ௠ఈ ො߮∗ ൅ ܾ௠ఈ߮ோ஽∗ ఙିఈିଵܺ݀ߠ.  
Collecting terms, we arrive at 
ܺு
ߙ ෤߮෠ு ൌ
ܾ௠ఈሺߪ െ 1ሻ
ߪ െ ߙ െ 1 ൫߮ோ஽
∗ ఙିఈିଵ െ ߮∗ఙିఈିଵ൯ ො߮∗
െ ܾ௠ఈ߮ோ஽∗ ఙିఈିଵ ቈ ߙ1 െ ߪ ൅ ߙ
1 െ ሺ߮ோ஽∗ /߮∗ሻଵିఙାఈ
1 െ ሺ߮ோ஽∗ /߮∗ሻఈ െ 1቉ܺ݀ߠ. 
In this equation the first term on the RHS is the effect of the proportional change of ߮∗ 
and ߮ோ஽∗ , the shift effect. The second term on the RHS marks the dilation effect. Since ߪ െ
ߙ െ 1 ൏ 0 and ߮ோ஽∗ ൐ ߮∗ the shift effect is positive. The dilation effect is ambiguous. It is 
negative once we restrict ߙ ൐ 1 െ ߪ ൅ ߙ ൐ 0 such that ሺ߮ோ஽∗ /߮∗ሻଵିఙାఈ ൏ ሺ߮ோ஽∗ /߮∗ሻఈ ൏ 1. It 
is positive when ሾߙሺ1 െ ሺ߮ோ஽∗ /߮∗ሻଵିఙାఈሻ ൏ ሺ1 െ ߪ ൅ ߙሻሺ1 െ ሺ߮ோ஽∗ /߮∗ሻఈሻሿ, which 
constitutes a sufficient condition for ෤߮෠ு ൐ 0. 
Similarly, we can derive that ෤߮෠ோ஽/݀ߠ ൐ 0. Recalling that   
෤߮ோ஽ሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ ൌ ൬ ଵଵିீ൫ఝೃವ∗ ൯ ׬ ߮
ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮∞ఝೃವ∗ ൰
భ
഑షభ
 , we can write: 
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ܺோ஽ ෤߮෠ோ஽ ൌ ቌ
׬ ߮ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮ஶఝೃವ∗
1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ߮ோ஽
∗ ఙିଵቍ݀ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ 
with ܺோ஽ ≡ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ ෤߮ோ஽ఙିଵ	ሾ1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻሿ ൐ 0. Applying the Pareto-distribution and 
rearranging gives:	
ܺோ஽ ෤߮෠ு ൌ െߙܾ௠
ఈሺߪ െ 1ሻ
ߪ െ ߙ െ 1 ߮ோ஽
∗ ఙିఈିଵ ො߮ோ஽∗ .	
	
Indirect imitation case: 
From (41) we know that 	
ො߮ோ஽∗ ൌ ො߮∗ ൅ ܺ݀ߠ 
with ܺ ≡ ቀ ௙ೃ̅ವ/௙ሺଵି఍ሻሺఙିଵሻቁ ൐ 0. Hence, 	
ܺு
ߙ ෤߮෠ு ൌ
ߙܾ௠ఈ
ߪ െ ߙ െ 1ቆ ො߮
∗ ൅ ߮ோ஽
∗ ିఈܺ݀ߠ
߮ோ஽∗ ିఈ െ ߮∗ିఈቇ ൫߮ோ஽
∗ ఙିఈିଵ െ ߮∗ఙିఈିଵ൯ 
൅൫߮ோ஽∗ ఙିఈିଵ െ ߮∗ఙିఈିଵ൯ܾ௠ఈ ො߮∗ ൅ ܾ௠ఈ߮ோ஽∗ ఙିఈିଵܺ݀ߠ.  
This expression is exactly the same as in the direct imitation case, implying that all results 
there carry over to the indirect imitation case. This also applies to the conditions we derived 
there that would ascertain ෤߮෠ு ൐ 0.  
Similarly, we can derive that ෤߮෠ோ஽/݀ߠ ൐ 0:  
ܺோ஽ ෤߮෠ோ஽ ൌ ቌ
׬ ߮ఙିଵ݃ሺ߮ሻ݀߮ஶఝೃವ∗
1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ െ ߮ோ஽
∗ ఙିଵቍ݀ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻ 
with ܺோ஽ ≡ ሺߪ െ 1ሻ ෤߮ோ஽ఙିଵ	ሾ1 െ ܩሺ߮ோ஽∗ ሻሿ ൐ 0. Applying the Pareto-distribution and 
rearranging gives:	
ܺோ஽ ෤߮෠ு ൌ െߙܾ௠
ఈሺߪ െ 1ሻ
ߪ െ ߙ െ 1 ߮ோ஽
∗ ఙିఈିଵ ො߮ோ஽∗ .	
